"De Minimis" Injury in Excessive Force Claims Defined by 10th Circuit
What makes a seizure unreasonable when interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution? How should reasonable be interpreted at the summary judgment stage, for the purposes of determining whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity? Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit significantly clarified competing doctrines in this area, releasing an opinion authored by Judge Tymkovich in the case of Robert and Mary Fisher v. The City of Las Cruces, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22825 (10th Cir. N.M. Oct. 19, 2009).
The Court recited the background of this strange case:
“After consuming at least two doses of Xanax, an anti-anxiety prescription medication, and the better part of a pint of vodka, Robert Fisher passed out in his backyard. When he awoke, he began to hallucinate that a large animal was threatening him. Fisher ran inside, retrieved a 9 millimeter handgun, and returned to the backyard to confront the illusion. Staggering and delirious, Fisher instead accidentally shot himself in the stomach. As he fell to his knees, his gun discharged again and a second bullet struck him in the left bicep.”
Id. at 22825. Las Cruces police department Officers Joann Schnell and Roberto Gutierrez responded to the scene, finding a bewildered Robert Fisher in the backyard, with his shirt off, nursing his wounds.
After retrieving Fisher’s gun, Officer Gutierrez ordered Fisher to lay on his bleeding stomach and spread his arms over his head. Fisher resisted this order, telling the officers that he could not comply due to his injuries. After repeating these orders, Fisher again did not comply. Officer Schnell then proceeded to handcuff Fisher behind his back. Because of the swelling to Fisher's bicep, she placed her knee into Fisher's back, in order to leverage his arms behind his body.
“Fisher begged not to be handcuffed in this manner. As he later reported: "I protested the handcuffing behind my back. I told the officers that it was not necessary and to consider my wounds. . . . I begged her not to handcuff me behind my back." Aplt. App. 77. The manner in which he was handcuffed--with a knee to his back, placing pressure on his stomach wound, and with his arms brought behind his body--caused, in Fisher's words, ‘excruciating pain. It felt like my bicep was tearing.’ Id. at 78.”
Id. at 22825. Fisher sued the officers under Section 1983, claiming the officers used excessive force, in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court ruled against Fisher at summary judgment, claiming his injuries were minor, and he had not offered enough evidence “that he suffered a non-de minimis injury.” Id.
After surviving the two-part test laid out for qualified immunity explained in Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 2007) , the Court reviewed United States Supreme Court doctrine found in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 (2001). The Court requires establishment of 1) a violation of a Constitutional right and 2) that the right was clearly established.
Following this analysis, the Court moved on to several balancing factors found in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) to explain that a seizure’s reasonableness turns not just on why or when it is made, but also on how it is accomplished. In some circumstances, an inquiry into objective reasonableness won’t just focus on why, but also how. The Court cited Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that, “If the plaintiff can prove that the officers used greater force than would have been reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest, he is entitled to damages resulting from that excessive force."
Applying prior doctrine, the Court analyzed, “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The Court drew extensively on Buck v. City of Albuquerque, the war protestor case from 2003, in which the city was sued for excessive force in dealing with individuals exercising their 1st Amendment rights:
“We do not agree with the concurrence that Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008), rejected a de minimis injury requirement where the injury occurs during the course of handcuffing. The facts of the case make it clear why not. Doyon (the only person even handcuffed) did not attempt to flee, or pose a threat to any officer or individual, but nonetheless, the ‘officers grabbed him, dragged him, and pushed him face down on the pavement. One officer kneed him in the back and pinned him to the ground. An officer pushed him face forward onto the roof of a police car, and he was exposed to tear gas while handcuffed in the car.’ Id. at 1290. … Doyon was exposed to gas while handcuffed in the police car. Buck, in short, cannot fairly be read as a case in which excessive force arises solely from the manner in which officers applied handcuffs, rather than from force independent of the handcuffing itself.”
Fisher at 22825.
Finding that discharge of a gun in the city limits of Las Cruces is only a petty misdemeanor, and therefore not a severe crime, and viewing facts in light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court concluded in Fisher’s favor on all three Graham factors. The Court found that a reasonable juror could find injury, if even tiny injury. Either way, physical injury was not required, so long as emotional injury, or dignitary injury, could also be independently found. Remand for further proceedings and trial was appropriate.
Stating a clear rule of law, “In Cortez we explained that in a handcuffing case ‘to recover on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the officers used greater force than would have been reasonably necessary to effect a lawful seizure, and (2) some actual injury caused by the unreasonable seizure that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional." Id. at 1129. Fisher at 22825.
In a concurrence on the judgment by Judge Gorsuch, he took issue with a rule requiring a showing of actual injury. “[O]utside the context of a claim alleging overly tight handcuffing, proof of injury [either physical or emotional] is not essential to an excessive force claim. See [Cortez] at 1129 n.24. “… [T]he circumstances of an encounter . . . may themselves be so outrageous as to demonstrate excessiveness’ without any evidence of a consequent injury).” Fisher at 22825.